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THE UNITED NATIONS SALE CONVENTION:
DELIMITATION, INFLUENCES, AND CONCURRENT
APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC LAW
Tamo Zwinge*
ABSTRACT
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods ("CISG" or "Convention") aims to create uniform
international sales law to facilitate international trade. However,
there are numerous sources of divergence in interpretation and appli-
cation of the Convention in different jurisdictions. It is therefore possi-
ble that courts of different countries interpret the words of the
Convention differently. This article investigates the major influences
of domestic law on the Convention's interpretation and application.
Notably, the so-called "homeward trend" of interpreters is discussed.
Furthermore, the article scrutinizes the scope of Article 4 of the CISG
in order to delimitate the Convention and domestic law. Thereafter,
the author investigates the consequences of overlapping Convention
law and domestic law, that is, whether a concurrent application is per-
missible as there is no provision in the Convention that expressly stip-
ulates that the Convention has to be applied exclusively. The purpose
of this article is to reveal that there is an intense interplay between
the Convention and domestic law in various areas. The author aims to
illustrate these interplays and to present different legal approaches on
how to handle them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been thirty years since the UN General Assembly
adopted the United Nations Convention On Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (1980) ("CISG" or "Convention").' It is considered
to be one of the most successful harmonisation efforts ever. 2 Seventy-
six countries, including all major economic powers except the United
Kingdom, have ratified the Convention.' The Convention has even in-
fluenced modern domestic law reforms, such as in China, where Chi-
nese sellers are very often familiar with the CISG due to the
1 See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter CISG].
2 Orkun Akseli, The CISG and Its Impact on National Legal Systems, 6 J. Bus. L.
630, 630 (2009) (reviewing FRANCO FERRARI, THE CISG AND ITS IMPACT ON NA-
TIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (2008)).
3 See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
- Status, UNCITRAL Homepage, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral
texts/salegoods/1980CISG status.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2010).
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unwillingness of many buyers to accept Chinese law as applicable
law.4
The Convention's goal is to create uniform international sales
law to facilitate international trade.' Therefore, uniformity forms the
basis of the Convention's existence.' The Preamble states in its third
paragraph that "the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts
for the international sale of goods . . . would contribute to the removal
of legal barriers in international trade and promote the development of
international trade."' Indeed, unifying sales law concepts and formu-
lating them in six official languages makes it much easier for parties
engaging in international trade to conclude contracts.' It simplifies
matters greatly when parties are familiar with the legal basis of the
contracts.9 Enacting the Convention was only the first step to unifica-
tion. As Felemegas put it:
The adoption of the CISG is only the preliminary step
towards the ultimate goal of unification of the law gov-
erning the international sale of goods. The area where
the battle for international unification will be fought and
won, or lost, is the interpretation of the CISG's provi-
sions. Only if the CISG is interpreted in a consistent
manner in all legal systems that have adopted it, will the
effort put into its drafting be worth anything."o
II. THE PRIMACY OF THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE CISG
As aforementioned, the purpose of the Convention is to create
uniform international sales law." Hence, the preferred interpretation
and application of the Convention is one that is free from domestic
influences. Article 7 provides a tool to do exactly that and thereby
4 Michael Bridge, Reviews, 72 MOD. L.R. 867, 869 (2009) (reviewing THE CISG
AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Franco Ferrari ed., 2008) and CISG
METHODOLOGY (Andr6 Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009)).
5 CAMILLA BAASCH ANDERSEN, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: UNDERSTANDING UNIFORMITY, THE GLOBAL JURISCONSULTORIUM AND
EXAMINATION AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE CISG 29 (2007).
6 See id.
7 CISG, supra note 1, pmbl (emphasis added).
8 See COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) 14 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter CISG COMMENTARY].
9 Id.
10 John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, in REVIEW OF THE CON-
VENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 2000-2001
115, 147 (2002).
11 BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 29.
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prescribes the primacy of a uniform application of the Convention.
Thus, Article 7 is a vital provision in achieving the uniformity of the
Convention.12
A. Promoting Uniformity: Article 7 of the CISG
Article 7 of the CISG consists of two paragraphs which serve
different purposes. Article 7(1) gives interpretation guidelines and 7(2)
provides gap-filling instruments."a However, there is some overlap be-
tween them. For instance, both paragraphs may support the Conven-
tion in keeping up with technical and economic developments
unforeseen by its drafters.14 Nevertheless, there are important dis-
tinctions between gap-filling and interpretive guidelines, even though
the borderline between the two is sometimes difficult to determine.1 5
1. Article 7(1): Interpretation Guidelines
Article 7(1) of the CISG stipulates that "regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application."'e It forms a general principle of interpretation, applica-
tion, and gap-filling common to all uniform law."
The purpose of Article 7(1) is to prevent the national laws of
the Contracting States from absorbing the CISG. Therefore, it aims to
preserve the Convention as international uniform law.'
The wording "regard is to be had to its international character
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application" in Article 7(1)
means that one should not use domestic law to interpret the Conven-
tion.'" It is by contrast to be read in an "autonomous" manner.2 0 That
is, when interpreting terms of the convention, one should not use the
meaning generally assigned to certain expressions within a particular
legal system. 2 ' Therefore, a Swiss court pointed out in 1993:
12 Id. at 30.
13 CISG COVIMENTARY, supra note 8, at 94.
14 See id. at 94.
15 See BAAscH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 129.
16 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
17 See INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw 63 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Christiana Fountou-
lakis eds., 2007).
18 Michael Bridge, Uniform and Harmonized Sales Law: Choice of Law Issues, in
JAlES J. FAWCETT, JONATHAN M. HARRIS, & MICHAEL BRIDGE, INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 905, 930 (2005).
19 Franco Ferrari, Do Courts Interpret the CISG Uniformly?, in Quo VADIS CISG?
CELEBRATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 4-5 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2005).
20 Id.
21 Id.
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[The CISG] is supposed to be interpreted autonomously
and not out of the perspective of the respective national
law of the forum. Thus . . . it is generally not decisive
whether the Convention is formally applied as particu-
larly this or that national law, as it is to be interpreted
autonomously and with regard to its international
character. 2 2
A non-autonomous interpretation, that is, a "domestic" inter-
pretation, would complicate the settlement of disputes. Additionally,
litigants would be encouraged to engage in forum shopping to apply
the most favourable domestic interpretation for their case.23 Such an
approach would significantly subvert the Convention's goal to create
uniformity in international trade.
In order to develop an autonomous and uniform interpretation,
foreign court decisions, awards, and foreign literature have to be con-
sidered.2 4 If a common interpretation has been developed in courts
and literature, later decision should follow it. 2 5 This is particularly
true for decisions of courts of last resort of a Contracting State.2 6
These decisions usually have persuasive authority for other courts. 2 7
Legal practice in this regard is nevertheless considerably diverse in
different countries. 28 Whereas some Italian courts excessively use a
comparative law approach, U.S. courts are generally more reluctant to
consult foreign case law.2 9
2. Article 7(2): Gap-Filling
Even though the Convention was drafted very thoroughly and
the drafters took into account many aspects of contracting, there are
still areas in the Convention which are not explicitly settled.o Article
7(2) is an important, albeit elusive, rule which is a useful tool for fill-
ing certain gaps in the Convention. It allows judges and arbitrators to
stay within the scope of the Convention, as opposed to the use of do-
22 Laufen des Kantons Berne [RA] [District Court], May 7, 1993 (Switz.), trans-
lated in CISG-Online, http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edulcisg/wais/db/cases2/930507s1.
html.
23 See Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of
Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25
J.L. & Com.75, 80 (2006).






30 See BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 125.
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mestic law, which is usually a less appealing alternative. 31 The provi-
sion prescribes a two-tier gap-filling method.3 2 Primarily, if a matter
is governed by the Convention but not expressly settled, then the gap
has to be filled in conformity with general principles on which the Con-
vention is based.33 Hence, it allows gap-filling both by analogy and
based on broader principles.34 If there are no general principles set-
tling the matter, then the issue has to be settled in conformity with the
rules of private international law, that is, domestic law.3
The general principles referred to in Article 7(2) emerge from
the text of the Convention as a whole. In a sense, they constitute the
spirit of the Convention.3 6 Courts and scholars have developed vast
literature on general principles, some of which are more controversial
than others.17 A point of criticism is that they do not provide practi-
tioners with a given set of rules governing interpretation.3 ' Rather,
they allow "a choice at a buffet of options," often enabling its user to
apply his domestic pre-conceived view on legal notions or issues."
B. Obstacles to Uniformity
Even though the tools to attain uniformity are included in the
Convention, there are some obstacles to its achievement that come
along with its international character. A major problem is that there is
no court of ultimate resort when it comes to the application of the
CISG.4 0 It is hardly possible to adjudge to the courts of one nation
greater persuasive value than to courts of another.4 1 One can even
31 Joseph Lookofsky, Walking the Article 7(2) Tightrope Between CISG and Do-
mestic Law, 25 J.L. & Com. 87, 88 (2005).
32 See BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 125.
33 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
34 Id. at 89.
3 See id.
36 Bridge, supra note 18, at 937.
37 See, e.g, Ulrich Magnus, General Principles of UN-Sales Law, 59 RABELS ZEIT-
scai-r 469 (1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/magnus.
html; see also CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 104; Bridge, supra note 18, at
938-940.
3 BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 130.
3 Id.
40 See INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 65.
41 One could argue, however, that the courts of certain countries generally provide
a more detailed reasoning in their judgment as opposed to others. One example is
certainly German courts. These courts do de facto have greater persuasive value.
It would however be wrong to grant them greater persuasive value merely because
of their "nationality."
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less advocate a doctrine of "supranational stare decisis"4 2 as there is a
lack of a rigid hierarchical structure of the various countries' court sys-
tems on an international level.4 3 Some authors advocate that "only
decisions of the highest court in any court hierarchy should be confi-
dently used to create persuasive precedents."4 4 In addition, arbitral
courts do not easily fit into any hierarchy.
Therefore, the Tribunale di Vigevano reached the conclusion
that "foreign case law, contrary to what a minority of authorities have
argued, is not binding on this [Tribunal]. It must nevertheless be con-
sidered in order to assure and to promote uniform enforcement of the
United Nations Convention, according to its article 7(1)."45
The difficulties that arise out of the lack of an international
court of last resort are softened by several factors. In 2004, UNCI-
TRAL published the Digest.4 6 It contains summaries of relevant CISG
case law on each provision of the CISG.4 7 Furthermore, the Advisory
Council of the CISG was created in 2001. The Advisory Council is a
private body consisting of scholars from all over the world who take an
independent, critical, and innovative approach on controversial, un-
resolved issues.4 8 The Advisory Council also addresses issues not pre-
viously dealt with by courts or arbitrators.4 9
Another difficulty in interpreting the CISG is that there are six
official language versions: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian,
and Spanish.o Each of the texts is equally authentic." In addition,
there are additional language versions for those countries whose lan-
guage is not the same as one of the six official versions. One example is
the German translation commissioned by the governments of Austria,
42 Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unin-
tended Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L
L. 111, 133 (1997).
43 Ferrari, supra note 19, at 21.
44 BRUNO ZELLER, CISG AND THE UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 35
(2007).
45 Trib., 12 July 2000, n.405, Giur. It. 213, translated in CISG-Online, http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edulcases/000712i3.html.
46 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 66.
47 Id. One must however be careful when assessing the persuasiveness of foreign
case law summarised in the Digest as the Digest only offers a "sound bite" of the
case, which might not reflect the case in its entirety. See Lookofsky, supra note 31,
at 90.
48 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 66.
49 Id.
50 Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System:
Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniform-
ity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & Com. 187, 189 (1998).
51 Id.
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Germany, and Switzerland.5 2 Even though these translations may be
unofficial, they certainly are the main source of the Convention provi-
sions for courts, arbitrators, and practitioners in those countries. 5 3
The different language versions of the CISG do not always completely
correspond as slight inaccuracies in translation are unavoidable. 54
One could however argue - albeit rather formalistically - that Article
7(1) of the CISG does not prescribe the Convention as being uniform,
but only that in its application regard is to be had for uniformity.5 5
III. INFLUENCES OF DOMESTIC LAw ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
CISG
The primacy of an autonomous interpretation of the Conven-
tion means that domestic influences should be minimised as much as
possible. A total exclusion of domestic influences is nevertheless im-
possible (and not even envisaged). The Convention tries to diminish
their importance by the above described techniques, namely by provid-
ing alternative interpretation and gap-filling methods." The role of
domestic law is therefore only a secondary one. Nonetheless, there is a
reference to private international law in Article 7(2) of the CISG in the
case of an absence of general principles.
A. Reference to Private International Law in Article 7(2)
Article 7(2) of the CISG stipulates:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Conven-
tion which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled
... in the absence of [general] principles, in conformity
with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law.5
There is agreement that the expression "private international
law" has to be interpreted "domestically.""s The CISG does not itself
determine private international law rules.s" The reference has "to be
understood as a reference to the private international law of the fo-
52 Id. at 190.
5 Id. at 192-193.
s4 Id. at 192.
5 BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 29.
56 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.
5 Id. art. 7(2).
58 See Ferrari, supra note 19, at 10. Another example for a term that has to be
interpreted "domestically" is the term "party."
59Id.
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rum.""o The application of the private international law will ulti-
mately lead to the application of domestic law and thereby break the
uniformity of international sales. Nevertheless, the major threat to
uniformity comes from a different angle.
B. Domestic Pre-Conceived Views of CISG Notions: The Homeward
Trend
The principal goal of enacting an international convention is to
create uniform rules for State parties." However, enacting uniform
rules is only the first step towards uniformity.6 2 Uniform rules alone
do not guarantee uniform application. 3 By contrast, it is almost inevi-
table that different countries interpret the words of the convention dif-
ferently.6 4 True uniformity can therefore only be achieved if courts
interpret the "provisions of an instrument in accordance with the ob-
ject and purpose as set forth in their Preamble and regard is to be had
to their international character." The principle of uniformity thus de-
mands that recourse to domestic law is only made in situations ex-
pressly stipulated in the convention." In case of the CISG, domestic
law is used only when filling external gaps.6
However, when the phrasing of the Convention is similar to do-
mestic rules, courts are naturally tempted to take advantage of such
similarity." Honnold labelled that phenomenon the "homeward
trend" and described it eloquently as follows:
The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by
tribunals (judges or arbitrators) who will be intimately
familiar only with their own domestic law. These tribu-
nals, regardless of their merit, will be subject to a natu-
ral tendency to read the international rules in light of
the legal ideas that have been imbedded at the core of
60 Ferrari, supra note19, at 10. See also Trib., sez. este, 25 Feb. 2004, n.40552,
Giur. It., translated in CISG-Online, http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edulcases/040225i3.
html.
61 R. J. C. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions, 27
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 450, 450-51 (1978).
62 See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 147.
63 Munday, supra note 61, at 450.
64 Id. at 450-51.
65 See Akseli, supra note 2, at 630.
66 ZELLER, supra note 44, at 30.
67 Id.
68 Komarov, supra note 23, at 78.
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their intellectual formation. The mind sees what the
mind has means of seeing.69
The biggest obstacle to uniformity is therefore the homeward
trend of interpreters.70 A strong homeward trend would probably be
as detrimental to the purpose of the Convention as the simple failure
of many nations to ratify it at all.7 1 Well-informed parties, especially
large corporations, would presumably either opt out of the Convention
or remain under the CISG in a favourable forum.7 2
The issue of the "homeward trend" is difficult to address as
courts often fall into comfortable patterns of domestic legal thinking. 3
Thus, it does not only manifest in an express matter but even more
likely at the "level of unarticulated and even unconscious background
suppositions." 74 Even when the drafters of the Convention agreed on
certain notions, they probably had different legal understandings of
them that reflected their own domestic legal background.7 ' The prob-
lem of varying legal ideologies is in a sense "built into the very text of
the CISG."7 6
Some courts and authors are nonetheless of the opinion that
legal concepts relating to domestic law might be consulted when the
wording of the Convention and the domestic provisions are the same or
very similar. U.S. courts are often tempted to have recourse to U.S.
case law when interpreting provisions of the CISG, whose language
tracks that of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").7 7 In
Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co. KG, a U.S. Dis-
trict Court stated that "case law interpreting analogous provisions of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ... may also inform a court
where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the
UCC.""7
69 JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 (1989).
70 See ZELLER, supra note 44, at 76.
71 Timothy N. Tuggey, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J.
540, 554 (1986).
72 Id.
7 See Bridge, supra note 4, at 871.
7 Flechtner, supra note 50, at 204.
7 Id.
76 Id.
7 See Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., KG, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12510, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
78 Id. (quoting Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir.
1995)); Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9122 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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Ferrari, however, argues that such an approach contradicts the
wording of Article 7(1) and even "violates the very rationale behind the
creation of the CISG: if all courts were to adopt this nationalistic ap-
proach, the uniformity the drafters of the CISG aimed at could never
be achieved."" Referring specifically to Article 2 of the UCC, he ar-
gues that "it is impossible and even perilous to assert that the . .. sets
of rules [of the UCC and the CISG] are similar in content, or, even
worse, that they are 'sufficiently compatible to support claims of over-
all consistency."'so He is supported by the U.S. court decision St. Paul
Guardian Insurance Co. v. Neuromed Medical Systems & Support
GmbH, where the court stated that "[t]he CISG aims to bring uniform-
ity to international business transactions, using simple, non-nation
specific language."s" Furthermore, the court stated in MCC-Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A. that
"[c]ourts applying the CISG cannot . .. substitut[e] familiar principles
of domestic law when the Convention requires a different result."8 2
Other authors take an intermediary approach and argue that
having recourse to domestic law conceptions is only permissible in
cases where a term or a solution in the Convention was clearly influ-
enced by that legal system. For example, some argue that the require-
ment in Article 74 that damages be foreseeable to be remunerable is
based on the "foreseeability test," which can be traced back to the com-
mon law doctrine that was established in Hadley v. Baxendale.8 3 Ac-
cordingly, it was argued that the relating legal materials may be
consulted when interpreting Article 74.84 Schlechtriem, however, ar-
gued that even in these cases "individual provisions should not be in-
terpreted against the background of, and as understood in, the legal
system from which they have been taken.""
7 See Ferrari, supra note 19, at 6-7.
80 Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Con-
struction of Uniform Law 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996) (quoting Eliza-
beth H. Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination,
22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 263, 275 (1986)).
81 St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Medical Systems & Support, GmbH,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096 , at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
82 MCC-Marble Ceramic Center Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, 144 F.3d
1384, at *21 (11th Cir. 1998).
83 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (L.R. Exch.); INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 63.
84 INTERNATIONAL SALEs LAW, supra note 17, at 63.
85 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 14; see also Ferrari, supra note 19, at 9-10.
Ferrari argues that even if the expressions in the CISG are textually identical,
they must be interpreted autonomously. Ferrari, supra note 19, at 9-10. They
must be considered to be independent from domestic concepts since international
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It is the author's opinion that a complete renouncement of do-
mestic conceptions of legal notions-albeit difficult to realize in prac-
tice-is the best and right way to interpret the Convention. This does
not necessarily mean that the results of an autonomous and a "domes-
tic" interpretation have to be different. It is only the progression to the
result and the reasoning that makes the difference.
IV. DELIMITATION OF THE CISG AND DOMESTIc LAW
In order to determine the delimitation of the CISG and domes-
tic law, it is critical to define the scope of the Convention. Everything
that falls out of the scope of the Convention is evidently dealt with by
domestic law. In contrast to domestic sales law, CISG is not integrated
in any body of uniform contract law, allowing gap-filling in this body of
law to fill gaps or to run on from its margins of application. The deter-
mination of the Convention's scope is, however, a complicated matter,
and the mere coverage of topics does not necessarily determine where
the outer limits of the Convention lie.8
A. Defining the Scope of the Convention
It is generally important to apply the Convention as widely as
possible in order to promote it as an effective uniform sales law.8 7
Therefore, the application of domestic private international law should
be minimized and Article 7(2) applied in a creative manner.8 8 How-
ever, although Article 7(2) is a powerful and useful tool to adapt the
scope of the Convention to matters unexpected by its drafters, it still
has its limitations. Article 7(2) is only applicable to matters that "are
governed" but "not expressly settled" by the Convention.8 9 Matters
that are "governed" and "expressly settled" as well as matters that are
"not governed" therefore fall outside the application area of Article
7(2).9o There are several reasons why a matter might not be governed
by the Convention. First and most obvious, the drafter of the Conven-
tion intended that this provision specifically exclude a matter from the
conventions are intended to be neutral. Id. Moreover, he argues, the choice for
one expression rather than another is the result of a compromise and does not
correspond to any specific domestic law. Id.
86 Bridge, supra note 18, at 932.
87 Id. at 937.
8 Id.
89 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2); see also Lookofsky, supra note 31, at 89.
90 Id.
THE UNITED NATIONS SALE CONVENTION
scope of the Convention." One example is "validity" in Article 4.92
Another reason is that changes in business methods lead to gaps.9 3
However, it is sometimes difficult to assess whether the draft-
ers of the Convention deliberately left certain matters open. If they
did, the question must be settled in conformity with the applicable do-
mestic law. 9 4 Matters are complicated further because the Convention
contains almost no general principles that are expressly described as
such.9 5
Significantly, questions surrounding what is included in the
Convention are equally as important as questions regarding what has
been excluded.96 Therefore, a uniform approach must apply to both
the inclusive and the exclusive rules.9 7 True uniformity of the scope of
the Convention can only be achieved if such a "dual approach" is
taken.98
The Convention includes a provision that describes its scope in
general terms. Article 4 states:
This Convention governs only the formation of the con-
tract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller
and the buyer arising from such a contract. In particular,
except as otherwise expressly provided in this Conven-
tion, it is not concerned with: (a) the validity of the con-
tract or of any of its provisions or of any usage; (b) the
effect which the contract may have on the property in the
goods sold."
The problem (or as some would argue, the merit) of Article 4 is
that it is very general and vague. It defines the scope of the Conven-
tion as matters of contract formation and the "rights and obligations of
the seller and buyer arising from such a contract."oo In addition, the
exclusions from its scope, especially "validity," are not described in de-
tail. The wording therefore leaves room for extensive interpretation.
91 ZELLER, supra note 44, at 33.
92 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
9 Id.
9 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 72.
9 Id.
96 ZELLER, supra note 44, at 64.
9 Id.
98 Id.
9 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
1oo Id.
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B. Controversial Cases
It is thus unsurprising that the determination of the scope of
the Convention and namely the interpretation of Article 4 raise some
very controversial issues.
1. The Scope of "Validity"
The first problem that immediately arises is that the Conven-
tion does not exclude validity per se from its scope but only "except as
otherwise expressly provided."o Consequently, the Convention is
concerned with some validity issues. 102 Examples include the Article
11 non-requirement of a particular form for a contract and Article 29,
which provides that a contract may be modified merely by agree-
ment. 1 0 3 Therefore, if one comes to the conclusion that a matter is a
"validity" issue, then one has to determine first if the matter is not
expressly dealt with in the Convention. The matter is excluded accord-
ing to Article 4(a) only if it is not.10 4
More importantly, although the CISG generally excludes mat-
ters of validity from its scope, the Convention does not define the term
"validity."'o It is thus unclear and controversial what the term actu-
ally means. The approach of an autonomous interpretation requires
not simply basing the definition on domestic law. The lack of a defini-
tion of validity is hence a gap in the Convention itself, and needs to be
filled in accordance with the principles in Article 7(2). In doing so,
"validity" must not be defined expansively because this would counter
the Convention's purpose of creating a uniform sales law.1 0 6 But even
with the help of Article 7(2), it remains very difficult to define "valid-
ity" because the Convention provides no textual assistance.'0o
Critics of an autonomous interpretation of validity express that
such an interpretation would lack flexibility in regards to matters
evolving from (domestic) public policy. However, one must recall that
the CISG is an international convention. Domestic legislation does not
apply to the CISG, but any changes would require an international
conference and a ratification of the amended version.' 0 Hence, public
policy that addresses validity is only permissible if the matter is not
101 Id.
102 ZELLER, supra note 44, at 69.
103 CISG, supra note 1, arts. 11, 29; HERBERT BERNSTEIN & JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY,
UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN EUROPE 23 (2d ed. 2003).
104 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
105 See Bridge, supra note 18, at 942.
106 Id. at 941-42.
107 Id. at 942.
108 ZELLER, supra note 44, at 75.
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already governed by the Convention. 09 If a matter is within the scope
of the Convention, it remains there despite the presence of domestic
legislation."o
The exact reach of validity therefore remains unclear. None-
theless, commentators generally agree that issues of illegality, fraud,
unconscionability, capacity to contract, duress, and agents' authority
are beyond the scope of the Convention."1'
2. Exclusion Clauses
Exclusion and penalty clauses are closely related to the "valid-
ity issue."11 Many legal systems subject exclusion and penalty
clauses to legislative control." 3 The extent of permissibility varies
from legal system to legal system." 4 Depending on the legal system,
these clauses may be without restrictions, permissible within limits, or
unlawful in general."1 s Thus, the question arises whether the express
exclusion of matters of validity in Article 4 embraces exclusion and
penalty clauses." 6
In the United States, for example, UCC Section 2-316 deals
with exclusion clauses as validity matters.117 Such clauses are ineffec-
tive unless certain words or types of words are used.11 8 A court look-
ing at exclusion clauses could therefore come to the conclusion that
exclusion clauses are matters of validity, and are thus outside the
scope of the Convention according to Article 4(a) of the CISG." 9 Do-
mestic rules would thus be applicable.'2 0 Zeller, however, argues that
the Convention deals with the matter of exclusion clauses, therefore
rendering Article 4(a) inapplicable.' 2 ' His argument is that exclusion
clauses are addressed by the Convention by general principles. He
states:
[T]he CISG deals with matters of disclaimers not in an
express fashion but by recourse to general principles....
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 103, at 23; HENRY DEEB GABRIEL, CON-
TRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 38-39 (2004); Flechtner, supra note 50, at 198.
112 Bridge, supra note 18, at 940-41.
113 Id. at 941.
114 id.
115 Id.
116 Bridge, supra note 18, at 941.
117 UCC § 2-316.
118 id.
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[A]rticle 8 .. . takes the party's objective as well as sub-
jective intent into consideration. Simply put, if the par-
ties intended that a disclaimer will limit the buyer's
remedies then a court or tribunal will give effect to that
intent. The advantage of the CISG in this case is that
the matter does not rest on some legalistic issue,
whether certain words or types of words are used, as it is
the case in § 2-316 of the UCC, but whether the parties
either objectively or subjectively agreed that a disclaimer
will govern the contractual relationship between buyer
and seller. 1 2 2
The author respectfully disagrees with Zeller's argument.
Firstly, Zeller argues that the validity-exclusion in Article 4(a) of the
CISG is inapplicable as the Convention is concerned with exclusion
clauses by general principles. 1 2 3 What Zeller omits is that Article 4(a)
stipulates that the Convention is not applicable to validity unless "ex-
pressly provided in the Convention."1 2 4 It is hardly arguable that a
general principle which was deducted from Article 8 complies with this
requirement. Secondly, Zeller confuses cause and effect when he ar-
gues that the Convention's approach on dealing with exclusion clauses
is "more advantageous" than the UCC approach, and the Convention
should therefore be applicable. Although it is arguable that the UCC
approach to condition the validity of exclusion clauses on the use of
certain words is overly formalistic, one cannot argue that this is a
strong case to treat them as non-validity matters in the Convention's
context.
Therefore, there are a considerable number of authors who are
of the opinion that exclusion clauses are a matter of validity and hence
not governed by the Convention. Bernstein and Lookofsky state that
"the CISG was not designed to 'police' international sales agreements
for unfairness: the CISG drafters made no attempt whatsoever to pre-
scribe the legal effect of . .. an allegedly unreasonable disclaimer or
limitation of liability, a 'penalty' clause, etc."125According to that point
of view, exclusion and penalty clauses lie outside the scope of the Con-
vention and are to be settled by domestic law. It is therefore arguable
that exclusion clauses are a matter of validity.
122 Id.
123 id.
124 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
125 BERNSTEIN & LoOKOFSKY, supra note 103, at 24.
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The Austrian Supreme Court supported this view in 2000, but
added a further component. 1 2 6 The Court argued that the validity of
an exclusion clause is generally to be determined by domestic law.1 2 7
However, domestic provisions that are contrary to the core values of
the Convention should be disregarded. 128 For example, if a domestic
law excluded the right to declare a contract void, the exclusion should
be disregarded. The right to terminate a contract could, however, be
excluded if the loyal party's right to claim compensatory damages
would be preserved.129 The Austrian Supreme Court thus argued that
the question of validity of exclusion clauses is left to domestic law. 130
Nevertheless, the CISG imposes certain limits on the applicable do-
mestic law. If the national law goes beyond these limits it is void under
the CISG.' 3
There is also another conceivable approach on the topic. It is
arguable that even if exclusion clauses are a matter of validity, it
would not necessarily mean that the Convention is not applicable to
them. Article 6 of the CISG allows the parties to modify or exclude any
of the Convention's provisions, including Article 4.132 The parties are
therefore entitled to derogate Article 4 in a way that it does not include
exclusion clauses, thereby rendering the Convention applicable to
them.' Such derogation from Article 4 does not have to be expressly
stated, but can be agreed upon implicitly.13 4
3. Penalty Clauses
The problem with penalty clauses is similar to exclusion
clauses. According to Article 4, the first question that must be asked is
whether or not penalty clauses are part of "the rights and obligations
of the seller and the buyer," and therefore fall within the scope of the
Convention.1 3 5 One must argue that the right of a buyer to claim the
payment of a penalty and the liability of a seller to comply constitute
"rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer.""'
126 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 7, 2000, 8 Ob 22/00v, Os-







132 CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
133 Bridge, supra note 18, at 942-943.
134 Id. at 945.
135 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
136 Bridge, supra note 18, at 944.
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The next step is determining if penalty clauses are part of the
matter of "validity," meaning they would be excluded from the scope of
the Convention under Article 4(a).13 7 Arguably, the components of va-
lidity should have some uniformity on an international level.1 3" An
approach that is too liberal would mean that the Convention is nar-
rowed too rigorously. Penalty clauses, however, are by no matter uni-
versally treated as a matter of validity. A number of countries do not
condemn or regulate them.a1 3  As a useful expedient, recourse can be
made to the Unidroit Principles. 1 4 0 Chapter three of the Unidroit
Principles, which deals with validity, does not include any reference to
penalty clauses.' 4 1 By contrast, they do include a reference in the
Chapter on Non-Performance.1 4 2 Assuming that the Unidroit Princi-
ples are a legitimate source of general principles and supplementation
to the Convention, they support the view that penalty clauses do not
fall within the scope of validity.
An "isolated" application of Article 7(2) of the CISG seems to
lead to the same result. Although it is correct that Article 74 generally
links the amount of damages to the effective loss suffered by the in-
jured party, it is arguable that this is not a fixed principle. First, the
Convention provides support for self-help, which includes the freedom
of parties to set the proper instrument to assess the amount of dam-
ages an injured party is allowed to claim.14 3 Second, the parties are
entitled to deviate from any provision of the Convention according to
Article 6.14 This allows parties to agree on penalty clauses.' 4 5
Overall, it is the author's opinion that there are convincing ar-
guments that the Convention is applicable to penalty and exclusion
clauses. Nevertheless, these arguments do not answer the question of
how to deal with them. According to Article 7(2) of the CISG, this is-
sue should be settled in conformity with the general principles of the
Convention.1 4 6 The very different solutions found in pertinent case
law and arbitral awards render it difficult to determine such general
137 Id. at 945.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 945. See International Institute for Unification and Private Law,
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994), available
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter
2004.pdf [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
141 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 140, arts. 3.1-3.16.
142 Id., art. 7.4.13.
143 Bridge, supra note 18, at 945.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 945.
146 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
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principles. 14 7  Solutions vary from recourse to private international
law principles to upholding clauses simply because they do not contra-
dict the Convention.1 8 Unfortunately, there is not yet a systematic
and convincing attempt to evaluate the relevant general principles. 1 49
4. Set-Off
The difficulties in determining the scope of the Convention go
beyond validity, as Article 4 states that the Convention governs the
"rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from [a
sales] contract."so The delimitation of the Convention's boundaries is
therefore not only complicated by the issue of validity but also by the
difficulty in determining whether an issue falls within the rights and
obligations of the seller arising from the contract.s' Set-off is an ex-
ample for such a latter case. It is arguable that a set-off does not have
any direct link to the sales contract, but forms part of another
contract. 152
Nevertheless, Magnus argues that set-off is within the scope of
the Convention and finds the appropriate principle in Article 84(2) of
the CISG. 5 s This provision stipulates that "[t]he buyer must account
to the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the goods."15
In other words, any benefit may be set-off against the buyer's claim for
refund of the price paid. Arguably, Magnus' solution has the benefit of
practicality, as it "makes the sometimes cumbersome conflict of laws
process obsolete."1 55
However, it remains unclear where the details of set-off come
from.1 5 1 Many of the details of set-off diverge in domestic laws, such
as the "date of extinction of claims set-off, the qualifying connection
between the claims . . . and the procedural pre-requisites to raising
set-off as a defence and its operation."15 ' These details would have to
be developed autonomously without any guidance from the provisions
of the Convention.1 5 s It is therefore more persuasive to assume that
147 See Bridge, supra note 18, at 946.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 946.
150 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
151 See ZELLER, supra note 44, at 71.
152 id.
153 Magnus, supra note 37, at 469.
154 CISG, supra note 1, art. 84(2).
155 Stefan Kr6ll, Selected Problems Concerning the CISG's Scope ofApplication, 25
J. L. & Com. 39, 52-53 (2005).
156 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 72-73, 103.
157 Id. at 73.
158 Id.
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set-off cannot be categorised as a matter governed by the Convention,
but must be settled according to domestic law.15 9
5. Lawyer's Fees
Another topic of frequent discussion is whether the Convention
rules on damages for breach govern the matter of whether the winning
party in sales litigation is entitled to claim compensation for its law-
yer's fees from the defeated party.16 0 If this matter is governed, is
there a general principle to settle the matter?16 1
A prominent case on that subject matter is Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores v. Hearthside Baking Co ("Zapata").162 In Zapata, the suc-
cessful CISG claimant argued that he should be reimbursed for its at-
torney's fees as part of the damages he suffered as a consequence of
the buyer's breach.16 3 Several previous European court decisions
granted such a claim under Article 74 of the CISG as an injured party
is generally entitled to full compensation.' 6 4
These courts reasoned that Article 74 permits an aggrieved
party to recover damages "equal to the loss ... suffered . .. as a conse-
quence of the breach."' 65 One can, therefore, plausibly argue that legal
expenses incurred by a party who succeeds in proving that the oppos-
ing party has breached a sales contract governed by the CISG are re-
coverable damages under Article 74 because they constitute "a loss
suffered as a consequence of the breach."166 Such a loss would also
have been foreseeable at the time the contract was formed.16 7
In Zapata, the court decided that the Convention does not im-
plicitly overturn the U.S. domestic rule that the litigation parties have
to bear their own legal expenses.' 6 s Judge Posner decided that the
matter is governed by the Convention but not expressly settled.16 9 He
pointed out that "[tihe Convention is about contracts, not about proce-
159 Heinz Georg Bamberger & Herbert Roth, eds., Beck'scher Online-Kommentar
BGB (16th ed., C.H. Beck, Minchen, 2010); CISG Article 4 para 19.
160 Lookofsky, supra note 31, at 95.
161 Id.
162 Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385 (7th Cir.
2002).
163 Id. at 387.
164 Lookofsky, supra note 31, at 95-96.
1r5 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
166 Id.
167 Harry M. Flechtner, Recovering Attorney's Fees as Damages Under the U.N.
Sales Convention (CISG): The Role of Case Law in the New International Commer-
cial Practice, with Comments on Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking, 22 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 121, 126 (2002).
168 Zapata, 313 F.3d at 388.
169 See id.
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dure."'o The court reasoned that the question of fee-shifting is usu-
ally part of procedural law and therefore not part of a substantive body
of law, such as contract law.1 7 1 It reasoned that for example the
"American rule" (no fee-shifting) and the "English rule" (fee-shifting)
were rules of general applicability and lie within procedural law.1 7 2
The court considered Article 7(2) of the CISG and addressed whether
there were any general principles that settle the matter.a7 3 Judge
Posner came to the conclusion that there were no such principles. He
pointed out:
[N] ot only is the question of attorneys' fees not "expressly
settled" in the Convention, it is not even mentioned. And
there are no "principles" that can be drawn out of the
provisions of the Convention for determining whether
"loss" [in Article 74] includes attorneys' fees; so by the
terms of the Convention itself the matter must be left to
domestic law.1 7 4
Nonetheless, the Zapata decision is controversial. Schlech-
triem commented that:
If national courts simply qualify the recoverability of liti-
gation costs and lawyers' fees as a procedural matter to
be decided under their own lex fori, thereby circum-
venting Art 74[,] . . . there will soon be more enclaves of
domestic law, which for the deciding judge may seem to
be self-evident and which conform to his or her convic-
tions, formed by historic rules and precedents.' 75
It is indeed questionable if the fee-shifting question must nec-
essarily be qualified as a procedural matter. By no means do all legal
systems qualify it as a pure procedural matter.' 6 In fact, under Ger-
man law, at least pre-litigation legal expenditures are compensable as





174 Zapata, 313 F.3d at 388.
175 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 7.
176 Even in Zapata, the court admitted that "[tihere are, however, numerous ex-
ceptions to the principle that provisions regarding attorneys' fees are part of gen-
eral procedure law. For example, federal antidiscrimination, antitrust, copyright,
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Therefore, even if one assumes that litigation costs are not
compensable because they are part of the procedural law, it is still
questionable if the same is also true for pre-litigation costs. The ques-
tion of whether "extra-judicial costs incurred in pursuing rights may
be claimed as separate loss within the meaning of Article 74 is contro-
versially discussed."s7 These costs are difficult to separate from gen-
eral mitigating damages costs.' 7 9 It is hence debatable that the
reimbursement of such costs falls within the Convention's scope. Natu-
rally, the recoverable amount is limited to the amount needed for a
normal and appropriate reaction to the other party's breach. 180 In the
author's opinion, there is no persuasive argument against treating
pre-litigation costs as part of the recoverable incidental damages
under Article 74. He would, however, not rule out that his opinion in
this case is influenced by his pre-conceived domestic view on this topic.
6. Interest Rates
One of the most obvious unresolved issues in the Convention is
the lack of a detailed provision determining the rates of interest. Arti-
cle 78 of the CISG states that "[i]f a party fails to pay the price or any
other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on
it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under arti-
cle 74 ."18 Thus, the legal basis for awarding interest is clearly given
in Article 78. However, the provision does not stipulate the rates of
interest or how these rates are to be determined. It is controversial
whether the interest rate is a matter that is governed by the Conven-
tion too or if the drafters deliberately excluded it from the scope of the
Convention.' 8 2 If it is governed by the Convention, are there any ap-
plicable general principles?
The interest issue has therefore become one of the most contro-
versial CISG subjects. A U.S. District Court stated in Chicago Prime
Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Company ("Chicago Prime
Packers") that, according to its research, the interest issue has been
the subject of up to thirty percent of total CISG cases worldwide.18 3 To
discuss this issue to its full extent, notably to present all of the differ-
ent suggested solutions, is beyond the scope of this paper.
example expenditures designed to mitigate the plaintiffs damages, would proba-
bly be covered as 'incidental' damages." Zapata, 313 F.3d at 388.
178 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 757.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
182 BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 126.
183 Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northern Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702,
715 (7th Cir. 2004).
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The District Court in Chicago Prime Packers noted that be-
cause of the vast discussions about the topic and the great controversy,
no single approach used by all courts can be determined.18 ' The court
therefore decided that - even though the interest rate issue is within
the Scope of the Convention - there is no general principle settling the
matter and had recourse to domestic law.15
However, the ICC International Court of Arbitration came to a
different result. Similar to the court in Chicago Prime Packers, it ac-
knowledged that the interest rate is not explicitly settled in the Con-
vention and that therefore recourse is to be taken to general
principles."8 ' In contrast to the Chicago Prime Packers decision, it as-
sumed that general principles to determine the interest rate can be
found in the Unidroit Principles and in the Principles of European
Contract Law ("PECL")."' Article 7.4.9(2) of the Unidroit Principles
stipulates that the interest rate corresponds to the average bank
short-term lending rate to prime borrowers.188 A corresponding rule is
found in Article 9.508(1) of the PECL.so The arbitrator considered
these two identical rules to constitute general principles in the sense of
Article 7(2). Thus, he applied an interest rate LIBORo90 plus two per-
cent, which corresponded to the bank short-term lending rate to
companies.x19
But it is also arguable that the decision of the Convention
drafters not to determine the interest rate in the text means that it is
outside the scope of the Convention. The Tribunal of International
Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation thus concluded
184 Id. at 716.
185 Id.
186 Chemical Fertilizer (Austria v. Switz.), Int'l Comm. Arb. Awards 8128 (1995),
reprinted in 123 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1024 (1996), translated in CISG-Online, http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edulcases/958128il.hrml#cx.
187 Id.
188 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 140, art. 7.4.9(2).
189 Principles of European Contract Law, art. 9.508(1), available at http://front
page.cbs.dk/law/commission-on-european-contract lawlPECL%20engelsk/engels
kpartI ogII.htm.
190 The London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") is a daily reference rate based
on the interest rates at which banks borrow unsecured funds from other banks in
the London interbank market.
191 Chemical Fertilizer (Austria v. Switz.), Int'l Comm. Arb. Awards 8128 (1995),
reprinted in 123 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1024 (1996), translated in CISG-Online, http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edulcases/958128il.hrml#cx.
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that the interest rate would have to be calculated according to domes-
tic law.19 2
These three examples demonstrate that there seems to be no
uniform criterion for the interest rate that is internationally accept-
able. Even proponents of a uniform approach do not agree on which
interest rate should be applied."' In addition, every attempt of legal
scholars needs to be treated with caution as the drafters of the Con-
vention could not solve this task either.1 9 4
Interestingly, the interest issue, although heavily debated in
theory, seems to be much less controversial in practice. According to
Baasch Andersen, an overwhelming majority of practitioners considers
it to be outside of the scope of the CISG."'9
V. CONCURRENT APPLICATION OF OVERLAPPING CISG LAW AND
DOMESTIc LAW
Defining the scope of the Convention's inclusions and exclu-
sions is only the first step in determining its relation to domestic law.
If one comes to the conclusion that a certain aspect lies within the
scope of the Convention, one has still to elaborate whether domestic
law is nevertheless applicable concurrently. There is no provision in
the Convention that expressly stipulates that the Convention must al-
ways be applied exclusively.
A. Tort Law
The greatest chance for an overlapping of the Convention with
domestic law is in the area of tort law. Parallel claims under contract
law and tort law are a common phenomenon in many legal systems.
Under domestic law, the claimant usually has the choice of whether he
claims damages under contract or tort law.19 6 However, some domestic
legal systems grant contract law priority over tort law rendering tort
192 Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation
(2000) Award No. 340, CISG-Online 1084 <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1
&do=case&id=876&step=FullText> (at 6 May 2010).
193 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 800.
194 Id.
195 BAASCH ANDERSEN, supra note 5, at 126; see also Volker Behr, The Sales Con-
vention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting to Problems in Practice, 17 J.L. &
COM. 263 (1998).
196 Under German law, for example, claims under tort law and contract law can be
alleged concurrently. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195, §§ 823, 280(1), 433.
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law inapplicable.1 9 7 Therefore, the question arises what the conse-
quences of concurrent damages claims under the CISG and domestic
tort law are.
Article 5 of the Convention includes a provision that concerns
the overlapping of domestic law and the CISG. 9 8 It expresses that the
"Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods to any person." 19 Article 5 thus
reduces the scope of the Convention as part of the applicable contract
law in certain cases. However, Article 5 is only applicable to the liabil-
ity of the seller for death or personal injury.2 00 That implies that it is
not applicable to property damages and financial loss. Hence, the Con-
vention is applicable in these cases.
An easily conceivable point of collision of concurrent claims
under tort law and the CISG comes with respect to Article 39. Specifi-
cally, Article 39(1) requires the buyer to "give notice to the seller speci-
fying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time."201
If a buyer fails to give such notice, he "loses the right to rely on a lack
of conformity."2 0 2 Therefore, the buyer might be deprived of damages
claims under the Convention. However, under domestic tort law, there
may be a concurrent damage claim not requiring such a notice. The
question now is if the CISG provision demanding such a notice is sim-
ply "bypassed" by having recourse on domestic tort law.2 0 3 The ques-
tion then arises whether the Convention is applicable concurrently or
exclusively to domestic tort law.
Some authors believe that the Convention's remedial rules
should be construed as "occupying the entire non-conformity field,"
hence denying access to alternative domestic law remedies.2 04
The author has a different opinion. The Convention was not
designed to deal with cases of unfair or culpable conduct and there is
no reason to assume that it pre-empts relevant domestic rules.20 5
Contractual and delictual remedies coexist in many States for good
reasons, and the concept of an independent duty of care in tort and
contract is common to many legal systems and should pose no difficul-
197 One example is the French rule of non cumule, which states that where there
is a contract, an action can only be brought under contract law and when there is
no contract an action can only be brought under tort law.
198 CISG, supra note 1, art. 5
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 CISG, supra note 1, art. 39.
202 Id. art. 39(1).
203 Bridge, supra note 18, at 950.
204 JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 72 (Kluwer Law
Int'l, 2d ed. 2004).
205 BERNSTEIN & LoOKOFSKY, supra note 103, at 81.
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ties.2 0 6 Furthermore, the ratification of the CISG does not mean that
a State intended to merge its contract law and tort law. The CISG
should thus remain applicable for what it was intended: the contrac-
tual side only.207 As a result, it seems clear that the Convention does
not aim to reach into national law.2 0 8
In addition, if the Convention would apply exclusively with its
prerequisites and limit of damage claims - such as Article 39 - the
conclusion of an international sales contract would partially disclaim
tort liability. 20 9 A part of the public order would hence be rendered
inoperative since injuries caused by defective goods often only appear
years after purchase. 2 1 0 Ultimately, in cases of a chain of distribution
with manufacturers and distributors the loss would eventually fall
randomly on those in the chain who bought under a CISG contract.2 1 1
Therefore, national tort law and the provisions of the CISG are appli-
cable concurrently if the domestic law does not provide otherwise.
B. Law on Misrepresentation
The concurrent application of domestic laws of misrepresenta-
tion and the Convention presents another problematic case. First, it is
already controversial whether innocent misrepresentation is outside
the scope of the CISG. If misrepresentation is deemed to be part of
validity, then it would be excluded from the scope of the CISG by Arti-
cle 4(a), and the matter would be governed by domestic law only.2 12
Second, if misrepresentation is outside the scope of the Convention,
should the applicable CISG avoidance-remedy nonetheless pre-empt
the domestic law on misrepresentation?
There would otherwise be a risk that the provisions on funda-
mental breach in Articles 49(1)(a) and 25 would be undermined. Arti-
cle 49(1)(a) stipulates that a buyer may only avoid a contract in case of
a "fundamental breach."2 1 3 The definition of a fundamental breach is
provided by Article 25.214 The purpose of these provisions is to render
it difficult to avoid a contract. However, in many legal systems, the
requirements for rescinding a contract because of innocent misrepre-
sentation are less stringent than those of Article 25.215 Although
206 Id. at 82.
207 Id.
208 Bridge, supra note 18, at 951.
209 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 79.
210 See id.
211 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, 79.
212 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a).
213 Id., art. 49(1)(a).
214 Id., art. 25.
215 See Bridge, supra note 18, at 947.
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avoiding and rescinding a contract is not the same, both means ulti-
mately serve to evade the contract.2 16
A further point of collision comes with Article 35. Conceivably,
there are cases where the "description required by the contract"217 or
another express term of the contract overlaps with a statement that
serves under national law as a misrepresentation. In such a case, Arti-
cle 39 would require the buyer to give notice of the lack of conformity if
he does not want to lose his remedies.2 1 8
The first question to answer is whether misrepresentation falls
within "the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising
from such a contract."2 1 9 If a contract is rescinded because of misrep-
resentation, then the rights and obligations do not emerge from the
contract but from the conditions preceding that contract. 2 2 0 Thus, in-
nocent misrepresentation is arguably outside the scope of the
Convention.
The second question is whether domestic law on innocent mis-
representation is concurrently applied to the Convention rules on
avoidance. The situation is very similar to the case of overlapping tort
law with the CISG.22 1 It is thus not surprising that the consequence is
the same. The mere fact that domestic rules on misrepresentation
sometimes differ and might be seen as a threat to "uniform" CISG in-
terpretation does not warrant the conclusion that domestic remedies
are pre-empted whenever the operative facts of the case are covered by
a CISG rule. The Convention was not designed to police against one
party's unfair conduct. In addition, the Convention drafters them-
selves refused to include a rule in the Convention that limited recourse
to domestic law.22 2 Therefore, there are no good reasons for shrinking
the application of domestic law of misrepresentation. Moreover, do-
mestic laws commonly require notice of rescission within a very short
period so the "risk" of falling afoul of Article 39 while retaining a right
to rescind is considerably reduced. 2 2 ' Thus, domestic laws on repre-
sentation are applicable, even if they compete with Convention rules.
C. Article 5 CISG and Product Liability Law
A very interesting provision of the CISG relating to the concur-
rent application of domestic law and Convention rules is Article 5 of
216 id.
217 CISG, supra note 1, art. 35.
218 Id. art. 39.
219 Id. art. 4.
220 Bridge, supra note 13, at 947.
221 Id. at 952.
222 BERNSTEIN & LOOKOFSKY, supra note 103, at 25.
223 Bridge, supra note 18, at 952-53.
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the CISG.2 24 The issue is: What is the effect of Article 5, which deals
with product liability law, on the relationship of the Convention to do-
mestic law?
Article 5 excludes losses arising from death or personal injury
from the scope of the Convention.2 2 5 It therefore constitutes an excep-
tion of the general rule in Article 74 that all direct losses are compen-
sable under the Convention.2 2 6 The reasoning behind Article 5 is that
the Convention should not compete with domestic product liability
rules.2 2 7 Or, in the words of Schlechtriem, "domestic rules on product
liability are not supposed to be 'disturbed' by the Convention."2 2 8
The Convention does not deal with product liability law and
therefore does not intend to supersede domestic law in that area.2 2 9
The provision was mainly required because some legal systems cat-
egorise product liability law as contractual law. 2 3 0 Article 5 aims to
ensure that these domestic contractual claims would still apply when
the Convention is enacted. 231 Thus, domestic law remains applicable
to matters covered by Article 5.232
The phrasing "caused by the goods" in Article 5 contains a limi-
tation of its scope. Therefore, if a seller injures the buyer when deliver-
ing the goods with his transport vehicle, Article 5 would not exclude
claims under the Convention.2 3 3 However, some argue that those an-
cillary duties of care should be exceptions under the Convention and
therefore implied only rarely in international sales contracts.2 3 4
Overall, there are two main areas of discussion when it comes
to the interpretation of Article 5:
* Can a buyer who had to indemnify sub-purchasers for
death or personal injury under domestic law hold the
original seller liable?
* Are Injuries to property and the resulting damages
exclusively governed by the Convention?
224 CISG, supra note 1, art. 5.
225 Id. art. 5.
226 Id. art. 74.
227 INTERNATIONAL SALEs LAW, supra note 17, at 55.
228 Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on Oberlandesgericht Diusseldorf 2 July
1993 (1994) available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930702g1.html.
229 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 55.
230 According to the above elaborations, product liability law would be applied con-
currently so long as it is characterised as tort law. Article 5, therefore, merely
states the obvious. INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 12, at 55.
231 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 17, at 55.
232 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 77.
233 Id.
234 Id.
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1. Recourse of the Buyer for his Liability to Sub-Purchasers
Some authors believe that Article 5 includes both the buyer's
claims based on death or personal injury suffered by the buyer himself
and claims based on the death or personal injury of customers. 23 5 It is
argued that Article 5 leaves all contractual liability claims untouched.
This includes claims following the chain of sale back to its origin,
namely the producer of the goods.2 3 6 Arguably, the words "any per-
son" of Article 5 cover injuries or death of third parties. Furthermore,
in many domestic legal systems, product liability has developed into a
system with special recourse actions for passing on liability from the
seller through the chain of distribution to the responsible manufac-
turer.2 3 7 Moreover, if the Convention applies, the buyer's claims could
be barred by Article 39 of the CISG for a lack of notice, and he would
have to recourse to domestic law anyway.2 38
However, it is the author's opinion that these arguments are
not persuasive. The strength and effectiveness of domestic product lia-
bility law should not bar the application of the Convention where it is
non-exclusive. A non-application of Article 5 would only mean that the
buyer has an additional claim under the Convention.2 3 9 Whether his
domestic claim is easier to enforce or more comprehensive should not
have any impact. For the same reasons, the weaknesses or limitations
of the Conventions, such as Article 39 of the CISG, should not be an
argument against its application either. In addition, it is not said that
domestic law does not have the same or even greater restrictions than
the Convention. Concerning the textual argument, one has to admit
that it is convincing at first glance. However, a buyer does not allege
damages for death or injury when he claims consequential damages
resulting from his liability for personal injury or death resulting from
defective goods sold by him to sub-purchasers. Instead, he claims pe-
cuniary damages as his injury is a pure financial one. He is enforcing
his own claim rather than that of the sub-purchasers. This situation
must be distinguished from the case where the sub-purchaser himself
takes proceedings against the manufacturer.
235 See, e.g., CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 77; INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW,
supra note 17, at 55.
236 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw, supra note 17, at 55.
237 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 78.
238 id.
239 That is admittedly not true in cases where domestic law grants contract law
priority over tort law. In these cases, an "additional" Convention claim with its
severe prerequisites would turn out to be a disadvantage to the buyer because it
would bar his domestic tort claim, which might have less stringent conditions. In
the author's opinion this problem should be addressed by the domestic legislator,
who, in an attempt to preserve its strict product liability tort laws, should provide
for an exceptional allowance of concurrent claims.
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All pecuniary losses should be dealt with equally under the
principle of full compensation pursuant to Article 74 of the CISG. Ar-
ticle 74 is very particular in addressing monetary losses and allows a
party to claim damages caused by a breach of the contract. 2 4 0 These
losses can occur in the form of direct losses, incidental losses, or other
losses consequential upon the breach.2 4 1 Overall, there is no need to
create the situation of a so-called "d6pecage" where it is not
necessary.2 4 2
2. Are Injuries to Property and the Resulting Damages Exclusively
Governed by the CISG?
Even though liability for death and personal injury is without a
doubt the most important domain of product liability, there are also
other fields. Article 5 does not exclude liability for injuries to prop-
erty.2 4 3 The drafters of the Convention considered using a broader
term like "claims based on product liability."24 4 However, delegates
could not agree to what extent the Convention should apply to prop-
erty damage caused by defective goods.2 4 5 Article 5 can also not be
applied by analogy in these cases. 2 4 6 Hence, the Convention is appli-
cable in cases of injuries to property. The question then arises as to
whether it applies concurrently or exclusively to domestic law and
most notably tort law.
Some authors argue that the Convention governs exclusively.
It is argued that in cases where the domestic rules and the Convention
rules turn on the same facts, the Convention must displace the domes-
tic law. Any other result would destroy the main aim of the Conven-
tion, that is, to create uniform rules.2 4 7 It is furthermore argued that
if the drafters of the Convention would have wanted domestic law to be
applicable, they would have included a similar provision to Article 4 of
the CISG for this case. Moreover, the fair balance between buyers and
sellers that was achieved with the Convention would be jeopardized if
the claimant has an additional domestic claim.2 4 8
240 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
241 ZELLER, supra note 44, at 66.
242 Black's Law Dictionary defines "d6pecage" as "[a] court's application of differ-
ent state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-
issue basis." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
243 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 76.
244 INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw, supra note 17, at 55-56.
245 id.
246 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 77.
247 JOHN H. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 121-22 (2d ed., Law and Taxation Pubs, 1991).
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However, numerous authors - including the present author -
believe that damages to property are non-exclusively regulated by the
Convention. Damages to property caused by the product are conse-
quential damages and are recoverable under Article 74 of the CISG if
they were foreseeable.2 4 9 Whether a concurrent claim in tort law is
applicable is a question decided by domestic law.25 0 A buyer can
therefore revert to domestic claims if his claims under the Convention
are, for example, barred by Article 39 of the CISG.
Another question is whether domestic contractual claims are
applicable concurrently with the Convention. One could draw a dis-
tinction between injuries to property and purely economic interests. If
the rights or remedies are ultimately based on injury to property, the
domestic claims, whether they are contractual, quasi-contractual, or
extra-contractual, remain applicable. If the buyer's interest is a
purely economic one created only by the sales contract, then the CISG
should apply exclusively.2 5 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Convention included the necessary provi-
sions to allow a uniform application of the Convention. Article 7(1) en-
shrines the primacy of an autonomous interpretation in the
Convention's text and Article 7(2) allows filling its gaps in a uniform
manner.
Nonetheless, the lack of an ultimate court of last resort indicat-
ess that the Convention will never be applied entirely uniformly on an
international level. Domestic conceptions of law still influence the in-
terpretation of the Convention. As Honnold said, "[tihe mind sees
what the mind has means of seeing."252 That timeless statement is
unlikely to be completely revoked and the "homeward trend" continues
to be the main obstacle to uniformity. In addition, the concurrent ap-
plication of domestic law - although entirely justified in the author's
opinion - renders the choice of the correct forum an important one. It
is thus still vital to know about the applicable domestic laws and how
the Convention is applied in the forum. However, courts increasingly
attempt to reach an autonomous interpretation that is consistent with
court decisions in other jurisdictions. The situation is therefore
improving.
The domain of delimitation of the Convention and domestic law
remains highly controversial. True uniformity would require agree-
249 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
250 See, e.g., CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 78-79; INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW, supra note 17, at 56.
251 CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 81.
252 HONNOLD, supra note 69, at 1.
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ment on both what is included in and what is excluded from the scope
of the Convention. Therefore, it is advisable to parties to a CISG con-
tract to include respective contractual provisions ruling the most con-
troversial issues, notably interest rates and lawyers' fees.
Overall, total uniform application of the Convention has not
been achieved (yet) and the influences of domestic law on international
sales and on the application of the Convention are still considerable.
That does not mean, however, that the Convention is a failure. Hon-
nold already remarked in 1988:
Throughout the work of uniform laws realists have told
us: Even if you get uniform laws you won't get uniform
results.... As our sad-faced realists predicted, interna-
tional unification is impossible. But before we despair,
perhaps we should consider the alternatives: "conflicts"
rules that are unclear and vary from forum to forum; na-
tional systems of substantive law expressed in doctrines
and languages that, for many of us, are impenetrable.
The relevant question is surely this: Is it possible to
make law for international trade a bit more accessible
and predictable?2 5 3
Referring to Honnold's above stated question, it is the author's
opinion that the answer is "yes." The Convention may not be applied
uniformly everywhere and further legal research and discussion is re-
quired. However, it has helped greatly to facilitate international trade.
It is better to make one step in the right direction than to remain
standing still and waiting for a perfect solution that may never come.
253 John Honnold The Sales Convention in Action - Uniform International Words:
Uniform Application? 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 207-208 (1988).
